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Question 
What unintended negative consequences have been identified as possibly resulting from cash 
transfer programming in fragile contexts and how have these been managed? 
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1. Overview  
There are various risks – notably theft, diversion, corruption, security, targeting, misuse 
by beneficiaries, inflationary effects - associated with cash transfer programmes in fragile 
contexts. However, the literature indicates that – while different - these are not any greater 
than those associated with other forms of aid, e.g. vouchers or in-kind goods, and could 
even be less. Cash transfer programmes have been successfully implemented in a 
number of fragile contexts, including Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia, the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, Chechnya and Syria. 
Risks in relation to cash transfer programmes include diversion or theft of funds, corruption in the 
selection of beneficiaries and in transfer of cash, collusion in corruption by aid agency staff 
and/or money transfer staff, fraud, and security risks to staff and beneficiaries. There is also the 
risk that beneficiaries will misuse the cash, wasting it on ‘vice goods’ such as alcohol and drugs. 
And that cash transfers could have inflationary effects on local markets, pushing up prices of key 
goods.  
Evidence of the above risks materialising in practice is very limited:  
 Diversion, theft and corruption – the literature suggests that in most contexts cash can be 
delivered safely, efficiently and accountably to people. Moreover, in some ways (e.g. 
being less bulky and visible) cash transfers are less prone to diversion and corruption. 
 Misuse of funds – there is strong consensus in the literature that beneficiaries do not 
spend cash transfers on vice goods such as alcohol and drugs. 
 Targeting – some issues were found with targeting in the context of the Gaza Strip, but 
overall (despite the greater attractiveness of cash), targeting of cash interventions was no 
more challenging or problematic than in-kind assistance. 
 Inflationary effects – in general cash transfers were not found to lead to inflationary 
effects, though there were exceptions where markets were not well-connected or people 
wanted similar goods. There is also some evidence that cash transfers have positive 
multiplier effects on local economies. 
 Armed groups – no evidence was found of cash transfers being diverted to armed 
groups, or of armed/non-state actors taking credit for cash transfer programmes. Indeed, 
these were not even identified in the literature as potential risks related to cash transfers. 
 Women – this report found no evidence that cash transfers are more controlled by men 
and hence disadvantage women. 
Overall, the literature finds that the risks associated with cash transfers are no greater than those 
associated with in-kind assistance, and they can be used effectively in fragile contexts: ‘Cash 
transfers have been used in fragile and conflict-affected states and to date there is not evidence 
that this results in large-scale diversion of aid or that cash is more prone to diversion than in-kind 
aid’ (Gordon, 2015: 3).  
Mitigation measures identified in the literature focus on the use of technology, notably e-transfers 
(e.g. through mobile phones, ATMs) and identity verification, as well as use of local existing 
money transfer mechanisms (such as remittance organisations) and clear, transparent targeting.   
The literature points to a strong evidence base: cash transfer programmes have been extensively 
researched and evaluated (ODI, 2015). A 2015 review found over a hundred evaluations and 
reports on humanitarian programmes that gave cash to people (Bailey & Harvey, 2015: 2), while 
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the High Level Panel on Humanitarian Cash Transfers looked at over 200 resources and studies 
on cash transfers (ODI, 2015: 8). According to Bailey and Harvey (2015) this stems from the 
relative novelty of cash in humanitarian aid, and perceptions/fears among donor agencies that 
cash would be misused. Doocey and Tappis (2016) claim to have carried out the first systematic 
review of cash-based approaches in humanitarian emergencies. But they could not draw 
definitive conclusions about the effectiveness of cash transfer or voucher programmes and called 
for further development of the evidence base. 
2. Unintended negative consequences 
Potential risks 
Holmes (2009) identifies a number of concerns with adoption of cash transfer (CT) programmes 
in conflict-affected settings. These include: the feasibility of delivering cash; the possibility of 
creating inflation in weak markets; the risk of corruption; and limited governmental institutional 
capacity, affecting delivery. Corruption risks are likely to increase in conflict-affected countries 
where governments are usually weak, the rule of law is not effectively enforced, the media and 
civil society are constrained and aid flows can become a lucrative resource (Elhawary & 
Aheeyar, 2008: 3). 
Chene (2010) lists the forms of fraud and corruption that can occur in delivery of cash to 
beneficiaries: diversion of cash by administrative staff; payments made to “ghost” beneficiaries; 
instances of collusion between administrative staff and beneficiaries or between staff processing 
the benefit and those paying the benefits; and informal “taxes” or kickbacks levied by the local 
elite once benefits have been paid. She adds that there are security risks involved with CT 
programmes, as moving cash around may be risky for both providers and recipients, especially in 
emergency and post-conflict contexts. She also identifies a number of risks with cash transfers in 
relation to targeting:  
 Unclear targeting and registration procedures leave room for discretion and create many 
opportunities for corruption, such as bribing those in charge of conducting the initial 
assessment to favour specific groups among the targeted population.  
 At the selection level, beneficiary lists can also be manipulated through bribery, false 
reporting or undue influence of the local elite, leading to multiple registrations, exclusion 
of eligible/inclusion of non-eligible households, overemphasis on the needs of specific 
groups over others, etc. 
 Cash transfer programmes can be more vulnerable to political manipulation and 
clientelism. When targeting methods are not transparent, politicians can use their 
discretion to target selected communities for purely political reasons.  
Many of these risks would apply equally to in-kind assistance. But because cash is more 
attractive, more people (including the better off) will want to be included in cash transfer 
programmes, making targeting potentially more challenging. Finally, Chene (2010) notes that 
cash transfers are sometimes feared to create inflationary risks: the injection of cash into the 
local economy may cause hikes in prices for key goods, with beneficiaries getting less for the 
money they receive and the purchasing power of recipients worsening over time. 
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Evidence 
Despite the risks, cash transfer programmes have been successfully implemented in a number of 
fragile contexts, including Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Chechnya and Syria (Gordon, 2015: 2). A study (Harvey, 2007, cited in Chene, 2010) exploring 
the feasibility of using cash vouchers in emergency contexts (affected by war or natural 
disasters) challenged the assumption that cash transfers are not suitable for fragile or post-
conflict countries which lack well-developed banking systems. Chene (2010) points out that cash 
transfers have been successfully used in Thailand, Indonesia, India and Sri Lanka in response to 
the Tsunami disaster and have also been implemented in conflict-affected contexts such as 
Somalia or Afghanistan.  
This review found limited evidence of the risks identified above materialising in practice. 
Diversion and corruption 
In 2010, evidence emerged from Somalia of the diversion of hundreds of millions of dollars of 
food aid, crippling confidence in aid agencies (Gordon, 2015). In 2011-2012, cash was used on a 
large scale in response to famine in Somalia, using local NGOs and the hawala system
1
. A 
UNICEF evaluation of the response found that: ‘Given the Somali aid environment, corruption 
and diversion were an acknowledged risk. Unsurprisingly, the evaluation raises issues of misuse 
of funds. Evidence suggests that these were less serious than comparable in-kind interventions, 
but still could have been countered through better risk analysis and preparedness and were not 
sufficiently identified by monitoring systems’ (UNICEF, 2012: 3). 
According to Gordon (2015) the largest documented case of fraud in a humanitarian programme 
providing money has been from a non-fragile context: the United States. In the wake of 
Hurricanes Rita and Katrina, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) quickly 
provided financial aid for housing and immediate needs through the Individuals and Households 
Program. As of February 2006 more than 2.6 million payments were made totalling over USD 6 
billion. The US Government Accounting Office estimated USD1 billion of these payments were 
fraudulent from bogus claims and double registration (Gordon, 2015: 2). 
The 2015 report of the High Level Panel on Humanitarian Cash Transfers looked at over 200 
resources and studies on cash transfers and found the ‘evidence is compelling: in most contexts, 
humanitarian cash transfers can be provided to people safely, efficiently and accountably…. 
Especially when delivered through digital payments, cash is no more prone to diversion than in-
kind assistance’ (ODI, 2015: 8). 
Doocey and Tappis (2016) carried out a systematic review of cash-based approaches in 
humanitarian emergencies and concluded: ‘Cash can be delivered and distributed in all contexts, 
provided appropriate precautionary measures are taken to ensure security of implementing 
agency staff and beneficiaries. Concerns about misuse, corruption or diversion of cash-based 
interventions are likely unfounded’ (2016: 60).  
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 Informal money transfer system operating outside of traditional banking, financial channels and remittance 
systems. 
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Misuse of funds by beneficiaries 
Chene (2010) found that while cash transfers are fungible and can be used on social goods 
(food, health, education) or anti-social goods (alcohol, drugs), this fungibility does not necessarily 
undermine the intended social protection objectives of the cash transfer programmes. ‘Evidence 
further suggests that recipients used the freedom of choice provided by unconditional cash 
transfers in a wide range of ways that directly or indirectly benefited children, from purchase of 
food, groceries, health and education services to investments in farming or small enterprise. 
These varied spending patterns generated further benefits and had a multiplier stimulating effect 
on the local economy’ (Chene, 2010: 4). 
A 2014 review of global evidence of use of cash transfers to buy ‘temptation goods’ such as 
alcohol and drugs looked at a total of 30 studies (including 19 with quantitative evidence on the 
evidence of cash transfers on temptation goods) with data from Latin America, Asia and Africa. 
‘Almost without exception, studies find either no significant impact or a significant negative 
impact of transfers on temptation goods’ (Evans & Popova, 2014: i). They conclude: ‘These 
results provide strong evidence that concerns that transfers will be used on alcohol and tobacco 
are unfounded’ (ibid: 14).  
In their review of humanitarian cash programming, Bailey and Harvey (2015: 3) found: ‘there has 
been very little evidence to date of anti-social expenditure with people overwhelmingly buying 
what they most need and not spending cash on alcohol or tobacco’. Similarly, Berg and Seferis 
(2015: 21) concluded from their review of cash-based interventions: ‘thus far, there has not been 
meaningful evidence that demonstrates cash or voucher transfers led to increases in anti-social 
spending’. They cite a 2014 IRC study in Lebanon which compared groups receiving cash with 
those not receiving cash; ‘it was observed that there was no significant difference in spending on 
beverages or sweets, but there was a significantly lower amount of tobacco spending by the cash 
group (“vice goods”)’. This led to the theory that, as vice goods are often used to alleviate stress, 
‘these results are potential evidence that cash assistance reduces tensions of beneficiaries’ 
(ibid).  
Targeting 
A report (Hammad & Pavanello, 2012) on beneficiary and community perspectives on the 
Palestinian National Cash Transfer Programme (PNCTP) found there were some issues with 
targeting. Respondents frequently used the term ‘injustice’ in relation to PNCTP beneficiaries, 
complaining that inclusion errors were linked to the entrenched system of patronage or wasta in 
the Gaza Strip as well as the West Bank. Some claimed that political affiliation influenced 
selection of PNCTP beneficiaries (ibid: 44). A number of beneficiaries reported that in some 
cases the payment slip had been transferred from the original recipient, who belonged to a 
vulnerable group such as widows or the disabled, to other family members – most often their 
male kin (usually fathers or brothers) with whom they lived. In some cases this led to 
appropriation of cash by the father/brother and the exclusion of the original beneficiary from 
ownership or management of the cash (ibid).   
Overall, however, the literature indicates that targeting of cash transfers does not seem to be any 
more problematic than targeting in-kind assistance (Bailey and Harvey, 2015).   
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Inflationary risks 
Chene cites a study reviewing unconditional cash transfers in 15 Eastern and Southern African 
countries which provided no evidence that these initiatives had an inflationary impact on the local 
economy (2010: 3).  Bailey and Harvey (2015) found that concerns that cash injections would 
cause inflation in local markets had generally not been realised, though there were exceptions in 
cases where markets were not well-connected and when people purchased similar goods amidst 
limited supply. They added that cash transfer interventions had had positive impacts on markets 
through multiplier effects and supporting local businesses, but this was not well-documented. 
3. Cash versus vouchers and in-kind assistance 
The literature indicates that, while risks involved in cash transfer programmes could be different 
to those for in-kind assistance, these are not necessarily greater and could even be less.  
In their review of the state of evidence on humanitarian cash programming, Bailey and Harvey 
(2015) conclude that:  
 Cash can be effective at meeting the needs of people dealing with the impacts of crisis 
and disaster, as a substitute or complement to in-kind aid. But it is not appropriate at all 
times and in all places. Markets need to be functioning or able to recover quickly enough 
to make goods available and effective delivery mechanisms are needed to overcome the 
risks involved in getting cash to people. 
 Despite evident concerns about giving people cash in situations of conflict and predatory 
political economies, experience to date shows that ways can be found to deliver and 
distribute cash safely and securely even in places affected by conflict. In some contexts, 
security concerns that affect in-kind distributions can be significantly lower for cash 
because transfers can be delivered directly to recipients through banks, ATMs, 
remittance companies and mobile phones – as compared to more bulky and visible in-
kind relief goods.  
 There is no evidence of cash assistance being more or less prone to diversion than other 
forms of assistance. Indeed, electronic transfers could reduce corruption risks through 
more transparent tracking – logical given that the greatest corruption risks for in-kind 
assistance are related to procurement, storage and transport. 
Chene (2010) argues that there is no conclusive evidence that cash transfers are more prone to 
corruption than payments in-kind. In Ethiopia for example, the switch from food to cash transfers 
in a Red Cross programme resulted in a significant reduction of theft and wastage associated 
with food distribution (Chene, 2010: 4). 
Gordon (2015: 3) similarly concludes: ‘Cash transfers have been used in fragile and conflict-
affected states and to date there is not evidence that this results in large-scale diversion of aid or 
that cash is more prone to diversion than in-kind aid. Although the current evidence base is not 
perfect, these findings have been echoed by the UK National Audit Office, which found in 2011 
that cash transfers could be delivered safely and cost effectively, and particularly highlighted that 
e-transfers offered a reduced risk of fraud as well as greater transparency and flexibility for 
beneficiaries (National Audit Office, 2011).’ 
The High Level Panel on Humanitarian Cash Transfers found that, in many contexts, cash was a 
better way to help people compared to in-kind alternatives. ‘The obvious concerns about using 
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cash – that it might cause inflation for key goods in local markets, be more prone to abuse and 
corruption or diversion or more difficult to target and might be more likely to be controlled by men 
and so disadvantage women – are not borne out by the evidence’ (ODI, 2015: 18). 
Doocey and Tappis (2016: v) claim to have conducted the first systematic review of cash-based 
approaches in humanitarian emergencies. They found that no definitive conclusions that are 
universally applicable to humanitarian policy could be drawn about the effectiveness of cash 
transfer or voucher programmes, and called for further development of the evidence base.  
4. Mitigation measures 
The literature identifies a number of mitigation measures for risks associated with cash transfers 
that have/could be used.  
Gordon (2015) advocates making effective use of technology:  
 Electronic transfers – Mobile money, ATM cards or e-vouchers can reduce the need for 
transport of physical cash, greatly reducing the risk of diversion and improving security 
for staff and beneficiaries. E-transfers can also be better traced than physical cash or in-
kind transfers, meaning any fraud or diversion is more likely to be picked up. However, 
because of the infrastructure required to set them up, e-transfers might not be feasible in 
all fragile contexts. 
 Use of money transfer agents – Moving money through businesses like banks or through 
money transfer companies reduces the risks associated with transport and storage of 
cash. Even in fragile contexts such as Somalia local money transfer systems are 
functional and able to reach people in insecure areas. However, due diligence is needed 
to avoid working with agents associated with extremist groups. 
 Use of improved distribution planning – to reduce theft and diversion, for example, 
limiting knowledge of cash movements, varying distribution days and locations, 
smaller/more frequent transfers or smaller/more frequent distributions to reduce the 
amount of money transported at once. 
 Identity verification – to avoid fraud, e.g. iris scans, biometric IDs or fingerprint scans. 
These methods have been successfully used in countries such as Pakistan and 
Afghanistan. 
Holmes (2009) argues that innovative design and implementation can be used for delivery 
mechanisms, drawing on what has been done in other countries. She notes that in Somalia and 
Afghanistan, reliance on the existing forms of money transfer mechanisms (such as remittance 
organisations) were effective and safe methods of delivering cash to beneficiaries, even in 
insecure areas.  
Farrington and Slater (2009) compared lump sum cash transfers with small, regular cash 
transfers in post-emergency and developmental contexts. They found that both payment 
methods were prone to corruption, but regular transfers offered some safeguards (e.g. amending 
beneficiary lists over time) which single lump sum payments did not offer. Moreover, they found 
evidence that lump sum transfers attracted corruption in the form of diversion of funds for political 
purposes ‘whereas politicians may find that re-directing small, regular payments to large 
numbers of individuals represents too much effort for too little gain’ (Farrington & Slater, 2009: 
vi). 
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Chene (2010) identifies a number of corruption risk mitigation strategies in relation to cash 
transfers: a) clear and transparent targeting mechanisms; b) robust and technology-enabled 
delivery mechanisms; c) effective monitoring and oversight; d) transparency and participation; 
and e) effective complaints mechanisms.  
In 2012 DFID piloted a mobile phone cash transfer scheme in four districts of Afghanistan in 
response to a severe drought in the previous year. An evaluation of the scheme found that ‘the 
M-Paisa system is generally a reliable option to transfer cash to rural and urban poor in a conflict 
situation like Afghanistan. Overall, sending remittances through mobile transfers in the four 
surveyed districts, proves to be generally reliable, targeted, secured and relatively cheap. It is not 
absolutely reliable – but it is relatively efficient in a context of increased diversion of food 
assistance and endemic corruption’ (Samuel Hall Consulting, 2014: 53). 
DFID’s 2011 evidence paper on cash transfers acknowledges that until recently these have not 
been a common choice in post-conflict programmes. It highlights the importance of careful 
targeting choices, innovative cash delivery mechanisms and identification of appropriate 
stakeholders. With regard to the latter, it gives the example of Zimbabwe’s Protracted Relief 
Programme, which reached two million people through major NGOs and UN agencies, in 
coordination with local government agencies (DFID, 2011: 58).  
The World Bank (2016) notes that the evolution of technology has provided favourable conditions 
for the use of cash transfers. E-payments improve transparency, reduce leakage and decrease 
costs. ‘The rapid growth of mobile phones and point-of-sale devices has created an opportunity 
to reach more poor people than ever before. For instance, nearly 7 of 10 people in the bottom 
fifth of the population in developing countries own a mobile phone, improving their access to 
markets and services’ (ibid: 4). Similarly, it argues that the price of biometric technology and 
smart cards has fallen to levels that make mass enrolment into electronic identification systems 
possible. 
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